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Abstract 
One frequently encounters the argument that trade liberalisation and 
deregulation of domestic markets in developing countries result in increased 
incentives for agriculture. This proposition is considered for the Central 
American countries, all of which passed through fundamental policy change 
either in the 1980s or 1990s.  After characterising the policy regimes in each 
country over various periods, the analysis moves to an inspection of 
agricultural trade performance.  The evidence indicates that liberalisation of 
foreign trade and deregulation of domestic markets has not been associated 
with improved agricultural performance.  It is suggested that the failure of 
agriculture to respond positively to policy changes can be in part explained 
by an unfavourable trend in world prices of the region’s major tradable 
commodities. 
 
 
Introduction 
 The debate over whether government interventions in markets have a positive or 
detrimental effect on the agricultural sector is an old one, going back to eighteenth century.  
While economic theory (and international trade theory in particular) has changed 
fundamentally in the subsequent two hundred and fifty years, the debate remains current.  
This study considers the impact of trade liberalisation and domestic market deregulation on 
the agricultural sectors of the five Central American countries.   During the 1960s and 1970s 
these countries pursued a regional import substitution strategy; then, in the second half of the 
1980s and early 1990s they shifted to less interventionist policy regimes.  The purpose is 
neither to critique nor to endorse a particular policy regime;  rather, it is to investigate, in the 
concrete, the response of the agricultural sector to a fundamental change in policy regime. 
                                                                 
* Forthcoming in the Journal of Development Studies.  The author wishes to thank the following 
people for their comments:  Degol Hailu, Ben Fine, Chris Cramer, and Graham Smith.  The 
research was in part funded under a contract from the Food and Agricultural Organisation. 
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In the context of this study, ‘liberalising’ refers to three categories of policy:  the 
macroeconomic regime, the trade regime and internal markets.  A country is designated as 
‘liberalised’ if:  1) in macro policy the exchange rate is determined through a relatively non-
interventionist ‘float’, and interest rates are deregulated;  2)  in the trade regime, non-tariff 
barriers are converted to tariffs, and the tariff structure reformed towards non-discrimination 
across products and sectors, with lower nominal rates;  and  3)  in internal markets, the role 
of state trading is reduced towards a minimum and direct price controls eliminated.  To 
avoid confusion, ‘deregulation’ will be used to refer to policy reforms affecting internal 
markets, and ‘trade liberalisation’ will be used to describe trade policy reform.  The words 
‘liberalised’ and ‘not liberalised’ will be used to summarise the overall policy regime.1   
 The general theoretical analysis of the effect of trade liberalisation and domestic 
market deregulation on resource allocation is well known and can be found in the standard 
textbooks.  If one makes the simplifying assumptions that an economy has only two 
products, both of which are tradable, then under autarky with perfect competition resources 
will be allocated to yield a composition of production consistent with domestic demand.  If 
all trade barriers are eliminated (‘free trade’), domestic prices will become equal to world 
prices.2  Because domestic markets are perfectly competitive (implying full employment), 
resources are reallocated consistent with the familiar marginal efficiency conditions.  This 
results in an increase in the output of the product whose price has risen, and a decline in the 
output of the product whose price has fallen (‘specialisation’).  Domestic demand for each 
product no longer equals the production of each.  Supply-demand equilibrium is achieved 
through international trade, which results in welfare gains.  If one makes further assumptions, 
such as no ‘factor reversals’ in production, the product whose price and output have risen 
will be the one which in production uses intensively the factor that is relatively abundant in 
the country.  It is this line of argument that yields the generalisation that a policy shift towards 
freer trade will result in a country realising its comparative advantage.  The analysis becomes 
                                                                 
1 It is not entirely satisfactory to use the root ‘liberalise’ in two senses, ‘trade liberalisation’ and 
‘liberalised’ (in the sense of the economy as a whole), but no better choice of words presents 
itself. 
2 The ‘small country’ assumption is made:  that the country in question supplies only a tiny 
portion of each product relatively to world production, so the country’s entry into world trade 
has no impact on world prices. 
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more complicated with more than two products,3 but, given the assumptions, the basic 
conclusion holds. 
 If one assumes that per capita income is inversely correlated with labour abundance, 
and that the agricultural sector is labour intensive relatively to other sectors, then it follows 
that a shift towards free trade will stimulate agriculture relatively to other sectors in low 
income countries.  To put the matter simply, trade barriers prevent the transmission of the 
price signals that indicate agriculture’s comparative advantage;  interventions in domestic 
markets prevent resource re-allocation in response to those signals.  To make the 
implications more concrete, this analysis implies that import substitution regimes will, in 
general, have a relatively detrimental impact on the agricultural sector.  This argument was 
made succinctly in an influential study sponsored by the World Bank of agricultural pricing in 
eighteen developing countries.  Generalising from their comparative study and referring to 
import substitution regimes in developing countries, Schiff and Valdés write: 
The bulk of discrimination against agriculture...comes from indirect price 
interventions, which are rooted in the national development strategies of 
industrialization based on import substitution. 
... 
Macroeconomic policies [in such strategies] caused the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, raised the relative cost of nontraded inputs, and reduced the real 
purchasing power of income received from the sales of export and import-
competing commodities.  And protection of domestic industry hurt agriculture by 
raising the domestic price of importable agricultural inputs above world prices, 
reducing the purchasing power of farm households as consumers of manufactured 
goods, and by causing further appreciation of the real exchange rate.  Such 
intervention usually reduced agriculture’s share of gross national product and was 
often related to slower growth in agricultural production and agricultural exports and 
to slower economic growth overall. (Schiff & Valdés 1992, pp. 199, 201) 
 In this approach, derivative from the theory summarised above, the depressing effect 
on agriculture is not only, or even primarily, the result of policies specific to that sector.4  
                                                                 
3 Most models assume at least three products:  an exportable, an importable, and a non-traded 
good, for example, construction (see Liang 1992 for analysis of trade policy in a three-
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This general argument has been applied specifically to Central America.  For example, in its 
1989 report on Central American economic integration, the World Bank recommended that 
‘...comprehensive trade liberalizing policy reforms are needed to encourage structural 
readjustments that would enable the region’s economies to perform more successfully in the 
current international environment’ (World Bank 1989, p. 2).5  In a more recent report on 
Honduras, it reviewed favourably the government’s moves towards freer trade and less 
regulated domestic markets: 
The [import substitution] trade and policy regime implemented by the Honduran 
government since the 1970s was one of increasing state intervention and control in 
agricultural markets of tradable goods.  This regime has reflected an anti-agricultural 
bias...  
... 
The economic reforms implemented since 1990 were inspired by a new reliance on 
markets and trade to promote efficiency and growth in the economy.  Consistent with 
this spirit, the government adopted policies to allow agricultural markets to operate 
with fewer controls...[P]olicies of price supports and trade monopoly were 
eliminated, as were most price controls and restrictions on the free flow of goods 
across borders.  (World Bank 1995a, pp. 13, 20)  
 The World Bank gave the same advice to Costa Rica in a 1988 report, with equal 
clarity: 
The key issue in trade policy is the need to reduce protection, which prevents the 
allocation of resources according to comparative advantage and hurts the export 
sector. 
... 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
commodity framework). 
4 ‘…[W]e found that the dominant influence on agricultural prices was through indirect, 
economywide policies’ (Schiff & Valdés 1992, p. 28).  A similar argument is presented in 
Edwards’ review of the trade liberalisation literature (Edwards 1993). 
5 Elsewhere in the same report, one reads:  ‘The primary motor for growth in the past was the 
expansion of trade, and this remains the most promising vehicle…To generate an expansion of 
trade…it is necessary to reduce the anti-export bias created by past ISI policies...[T]rade 
liberalization is required to provide a better incentive framework... (World Bank 1989, p. iii) 
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Price, tax and subsidy policies have been areas of major reform since 1985.  The 
aim has been to reduce intersectoral and intercrop price distortions in order to fully 
exploit the country’s comparative advantages. (World Bank 1988, pp. 11, 21) 
 The general argument, recommended to the Central American governments (and 
implemented, see below), might be called the ‘liberalisation/deregulation’ hypothesis:  that a 
shift away from an import substitution regime towards a substantially less interventionist 
strategy, favours the development of agriculture.  In what follows, that hypothesis is tested 
for the Central American countries. 
 
Agricultural Performance in Central America 
 As a first step to investigate empirically this hypothesis for Central America, Table 1 
summarises the evolution of policy regimes in the region.6  In the early 1960s, the 
governments of the region agreed on a series of measures, including a common external 
tariff, to create the Central American Common Market, which officially came into operation 
in 1963.   The 1970s brought the fullest development of the CACM, not withstanding that 
Honduras abandoned the enterprise at the start of the decade.  To the extent that the four 
remaining Central American countries engaged in a purposeful policy of import substitution, 
it occurred in the 1970s.  For all of the countries except Honduras, the period 1970-79 was 
characterised by a policy framework designed to shift the structure of aggregate production 
and exports towards industry.  This desired outcome was achieved, though perhaps not as 
dramatically as policymakers had hoped.  In 1960, manufacturing value added was fourteen 
percent of regional GDP, and rose to eighteen percent in 1975.  Over the same period 
within manufacturing, food and textiles declined from eighty percent of total output to sixty-
one percent (Weeks 1985, pp. 135-136), with most relative increases occurring in 
intermediate products (e.g., industrial chemicals) and consumer durables.  In trade, the five 
major agricultural products accounted for seventy-seven percent of exports during 1960-64, 
and sixty-two percent during 1975-79.7  With the exception of Honduras, import 
substitution regimes ruled in Central America during the 1970s. 
                                                                 
6 Changes in policies are presented in detail in Annex 1. 
7 These were bananas, coffee, cotton, meat products and sugar. 
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 By the late 1970s, the CACM was on the wane, due to domestic, regional, and 
international factors.  The overthrow of the Somoza regime brought a new government to 
Nicaragua that was ideologically committed to a high degree of intervention in national 
markets.  Roughly contemporaneous with this, civil war broke out in El Salvador.  The 
response of the Salvadorean governments was to implement policies which were in many 
cases as heavily interventionist as in Nicaragua (albeit from a different political perspective).  
During 1980-85, both countries can be characterised as ‘strongly interventionist’, especially 
in their trade policies.8  In Costa Rica and Guatemala policy evolved in the opposite 
direction, toward deregulation and liberalisation, and more so for the former than the latter 
during the first half of the 1980s.  In the second half of the decade, both countries continued 
to reform policy, and we characterise them as ‘liberalised’, meaning that they had 
substantially ‘reduced the extent of anti-export bias’ (Edwards 1993, ftnt, p. 1371) by 
meeting the three policy criteria discussed in the introduction.   The second half of the 
decade also brought liberalising moves in El Salvador and Nicaragua, though from a 
considerably more interventionist starting point.  Honduras was a special case.  While its 
policies changed less than for any of the countries in the 1980s, Honduras began the decade 
with the least interventionist economic policy of the five countries.  By the time it initiated 
purposeful and broad policy reform in the early 1990s (Thorpe 1995), perhaps all four of 
the other countries had passed it in the race for trade liberalisation and deregulation.   
 After the early 1990s, the Central American countries had comprehensively reduced 
state regulation. Table 1 summarises the discussion of policy regimes,9 with the shaded cells 
indicating a high degree of liberalisation.  No country in practice can eliminate all government 
interventions in economic life, but during the shaded periods the Central American countries 
were as close to this as any in Latin America.  We shall use the binary classification of 
                                                                 
8 In the 1987 World Development Report, all five Central American countries were defined as 
‘moderately inward oriented’ by the World Bank for the period 1973-1985 (World Bank 1987).  
This assessment would be correct up to 1979, and agrees with Table 1.  However, during 1980-
1985 Nicaragua was probably the most protectionist country in Latin America after Cuba, and 
Costa Rica had initiated trade reforms.  The problem with the World Bank categorisation is not 
conceptual or factual, but rather the long time period, during which some countries changed their 
policy regimes. 
9 A general survey of policy changes for all Latin American countries is found in Bulmer-Thomas 
(1992).  The table is based primarily on Paz Calferata (1993) and Buttari (1990), where 
chronologies of policy changes are given in tables.  Other useful sources are Garay (1995), 
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countries ‘not liberalised’ and ‘liberalised’, in the statistical work below.  This approach is 
common in the literature (see Edwards 1993, passim), though it involves a degree of 
arbitrariness.10  The alternative, composite indices of liberalisation, are by their nature ordinal 
and not without their own difficulties and arbitrariness of weightings.11  For all its difficulties, 
the binary classification seems most appropriate for this study.   
 As noted at the outset, the hypothesis is that a liberalised trade regime and a 
deregulated domestic economy would favour the agricultural sector in Central America:  
first, because interventions associated with import substitution are assumed to turn the terms 
of trade against agriculture;  second, because the sector’s output is overwhelmingly tradable;  
and third, because agriculture is presumed to be labour intensive, and the countries abundant 
in labour.  Certainly, the tradability criterion applies to Central American agriculture, where 
output is almost entirely either export products12 or internationally traded staples.13 
  
[Table 1 goes here] 
 
 Prior to considering the impact of trade liberalisation and domestic deregulation on 
agriculture, it is relevant to review the performance of agriculture in the Central American 
countries.  Table 2 shows annual average rates of growth of agricultural value added at 
constant prices, with the liberalised periods shaded (as in subsequent tables), and the five 
year periods of most rapid growth highlighted in bold.  For all five countries, the most rapid 
rate of growth was during the years of most intense implementation of the import substitution 
strategy, 1970-74, or in the previous decade when such policies were being put into place.  
Why this might be the case is considered below.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
CEPAL (1995), Dean, Desai and Riedel (1994), which covers only Costa Rica among our 
countries, World Bank (1988) for Costa Rica only, and World Bank (1989). 
10 As Edwards writes:  ‘...[T]here was a nontrivial degree of arbitrariness in classifying 
countries... [by use of] binary dummies [which] precluded the analysis of how different grades 
of trade liberalization affect growth and other key variables’ (Edwards 1993, p. 1373). 
11 For a discussion of the arbitrariness of policy indices, see Weeks (1997). 
12 The most important of these for the region were coffee, bananas, sugar, livestock, and cotton, 
though the latter declined dramatically in the 1980s.  In the late 1980s and 1990s non-traditional 
export crops, such as fruits and market vegetables became important in Costa Rica and 
Guatemala. 
13 The region’s most important staple was maize, followed by rice and beans.  A fourth 
internationally traded crop of domestic consumption was sorghum, used both for animal feed and 
human consumption. 
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 We look next at overall export performance, relevant because the vast majority of 
each country’s exports were agricultural.  One explicitly anticipated outcome of the shift 
towards a policy regime with less government intervention in Central America was reduction 
of anti-export bias.  Table 3 provides a crude test of the impact of trade liberalisation, by 
calculating the trend in constant price exports, with a dummy variable corresponding to the 
liberalisation years (see Annex 1 and Annex 2 for details).14  The table supports the null 
hypothesis that the shift in policy had no impact on real export growth, with the exception of 
Guatemala, for which the coefficient on the shift variable is negative (significant at the .05 
level).  For El Salvador and Nicaragua is the shift variable of the predicted sign.  These two 
positive (but non-significant) coefficients give no evidence for or against the trade 
liberalisation hypothesis, since any export improvement for these countries might be 
explained by the end of armed conflict.  While Tables 2 and 3 should be taken as indicative 
rather than definitive, they suggest a need to re-assess the degree of export bias during the 
period of import substitution policies in Central America.  
 
[Tables 2 and 3 go here] 
 
 Turning to a detailed consideration of the performance of the agricultural component 
of trade, we can summarise the hypothesis to test for Central America:  if interventions 
discouraged agriculture, if the sector’s output consisted of tradables, if the sector were 
labour intensive, and if the countries were abundant in labour, trade liberalisation and 
domestic deregulation would reveal a strong comparative advantage in agriculture.  This 
comparative advantage would manifest itself in an increase of net exports for the sector.  
Part A of the Table 4 shows that in absolute terms (millions of US dollars) the net exports of 
the agricultural sector declined in four countries:  El Salvador (from the early 1980s), 
Guatemala (also from the early 1980s), Honduras (from the second half of the 1980s), and 
Nicaragua (from the 1970s onwards).  Only in Costa Rica does one observe an increase (in 
each period).   
 A more relevant measure is presented in the second part of the table.  The ideal 
relative calculation would be net exports as a proportion of the gross output of agriculture, 
                                                                 
14 Since the purpose is to test the hypothesis that policy change impacted on exports, no attempt 
is made for a general search for structural breaks in the data series. 
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but time series data on sectoral gross output is notoriously difficult to obtain.  The standard 
proxy is to use the value added of sectors as the denominator (Wood 1994), which imparts 
no bias if the proportion of intermediate cost in total cost is constant over time.  For all five 
countries there is a common pattern for the period 1965-1979 (import substitution period), 
high and rising relative net exports.  Then, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua entered 
into sharp decline.  Decline also occurred in Honduras, but by considerably less.  Only in 
Costa Rica is post-ISI associated with a rise in net agricultural exports. 
 
 [Table 4 goes here] 
 
 One might explain the decline in net exports for El Salvador during the 1980s by the 
effect of war, largely fought in the countryside.  In the 1990s the war was over, yet net 
exports declined dramatically, from an average of over forty percent of agricultural value 
added during 1985-89, to eleven percent during 1990-94.  Similarly, armed conflict might 
be summoned to account for the sharp decrease in Nicaragua.  Net exports represented 
over seventy percent of agricultural value added in the 1970s, then fell to thirty-eight percent 
during 1980-84, and to eighteen percent during 1985-89.  From an orthodox perspective, 
these declines would also be attributed to the strong price and non-price interventions by the 
Sandinista government (e.g.,  an overvalued exchange rate and low producer prices through 
state-controlled marketing, see Annex 1).  However, with the policy reforms of the 1990s, 
net agricultural exports continued to drop, to below ten percent.  Net agricultural exports in 
Guatemala remained the same from the first half of the 1980s to the second half, then 
dropped by a full ten percentage points in the period we describe as ‘liberalised’. 
 
 
 
 
 A Model of the Trade Balance 
 
 While the evidence presented so far suggests that liberalisation was not associated 
with a revealed comparative advantage in agriculture in the Central American countries, this 
has not been analysed in a rigorous framework.  To do this, we develop a model of the 
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determination of net exports from the sector.  The model is constructed with the following 
variables: 
 Xt = total agricultural exports, 
 Mt = total agricultural imports 
 SHGDPt = GDPagrict/ GDPt] = share of agricultural value added (GDPagrict, 
agricultural GDP) in total value added (GDPt), 
 RERt, = real exchange rate, and 
RPAMt = ratio of the agricultural price index to the manufacturing price index. 
  
Relative net exports of agricultural products are defined as the following ratio: 
(1) Xnt = Xt /Mt 
 The agricultural trade balance of a country will depend on its natural endowments 
and level of development.  Abstracting from the former, one would expect the agricultural 
trade balance of country to be related to the share of agriculture in gross domestic product.  
A high ratio of agricultural value added to national income implies that a large portion of the 
population is in agriculture, and a correspondingly low degree of urbanisation.  As a result, 
the internal demand for marketed agricultural output is low.  On-farm consumption and 
exports tend to be high proportions of the sector’s production, and imports of agricultural 
commodities, largely for the urban population, are correspondingly low.  This is, of course, 
one of the structural reasons that the more underdeveloped countries are net agricultural 
exporters.  Defining the share of agricultural value added in GDP as [GDPagrict/ GDPt] = 
SHGDPt , we can write: 
(2a) Xt   = jx[SHGDPt]
ax   for agricultural exports, 
(2b) Mt   = jm[SHGDPt]
am  for agricultural imports,  
 and jx and jm are to be determined, and predicted to be greater than zero. 
    Substituting (2a) and (2b) into (1), 
(3)  Xnt = Xt/Mt  = {jx[SHGDPt]ax}/{jm[SHGDPt]am} 
 The agricultural trade balance is assumed to have an equilibrium value determined by 
two relative prices:  1) the real exchange rate (RER), indicating the relative return between 
tradables and non-tradables for the economy as a whole;  and 2) the relative price of 
agricultural products to other tradables (RPAM), signalling the relative return between the 
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tradable sectors.  The latter is approximated by the ratio of agricultural prices to 
manufacturing prices.  Relative prices enter the model through their effect on the export and 
import coefficients (terms jx and jm).  Converting these parameters to functions of relative 
prices, in general form, one has:  
(4a) jx = jx(RERt, RPAMt ),  
(4b) jm = jm(RERt) 
 Exports of agricultural commodities should rise with a real depreciation of the 
exchange rate (defined as +DRER), as a result of the general incentive imparted to 
tradables.  A rise in agricultural prices relatively to manufacturing prices shifts resources to 
agriculture within the tradable sector (+DRPAM).  For imports it is assumed that only the 
real exchange rate is relevant;  i.e., that a relative price shift between agriculture and 
manufacturing has no impact on agricultural imports.  Using log-linear form for RER and 
RPAM, the equilibrium agricultural trade ratio is: 
 
(5) 
 
Xnt* = 
{[RERt]a1[RPAMt]b[SHGDPt] ax}     ________________________________________________________________________________________ 
      {[RERt]a2[SHGDPt] am} 
 
 The actual change in relative net exports in any time period is assumed to follow a 
partial adjustment to equilibrium, in response to the difference between the equilibrium value 
for the current period and the actual value in the previous period: 
(6)  Xnt/Xnt-1 = (Xnt*/Xnt-1)
g   where, 0 < g < 1. 
 Substituting expression (5) into (6), and expressing in logarithmic form, with the 
variables now ratios of their values in period t and t-1 (distinguished by small letters):15 
(7) ln[xnt] =  [lnXnt - lnXnt-1] = g[a1 - a2]ln[rert] + gbln[rpamt]  
 + g[ax - am]ln[shgdpt] - g[Xnt-2] 
   The estimation is across all five countries.  This is justified by the relatively high 
degree of integration among the five, which includes not only trade and capital flows, but 
also labour mobility.16 ?To test for the impact of the change in policy regime, we introduce a 
                                                                 
15 For example, rert = ? RERt]/? RERt-1], shgdpt = ? SHGDPt]/? SHGDPt-1], etc. 
16 While there was not free mobility of labour among the countries over the period under study, 
there was considerable legal and illegal migration of agricultural workers, especially from El 
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dummy variable for ‘policy’ that takes the value of unity for the years in each country 
defined as ‘liberalised’ (see Annex 1 for policies, Annex 2 for dummy variables).   As 
discussed above, in two of the countries, El Salvador and Nicaragua, armed conflicts 
disrupted economic activity, especially in the agricultural sector.  To accommodate this, a 
‘conflict’ variable is introduced, with the value of unity for conflict-affected years (see Annex 
2).  The equation for estimation is: 
(8)  ln[xnt] =  ao +  a1ln[rert] + a2ln[rpamt] + a3ln[shgdpt] + a4[xnt-2]   
  a5[cnfltt] + a6[Polt] + a7[Es] + ... + a10[Nic] + e 
 It is predicted that  a1 > 0, a2 > 0, a3 > 0, and a4 < 0, and statistically significant.  
For the hypothesis testing variables, the expected signs are a5 < 0, and the sign of the 
‘policy’ coefficient (a6) to be revealed.  Use of the first relative difference for the dependent 
variable (xnt) would result in extremely large changes for some years, especially in the few 
cases in which the relative trade balance changes from positive to negative.17  Therefore, the 
absolute percentage point change is used, [Xnt] - [Xnt-1]. 
 The results of modelling exercise are presented in Table 5.  The model accounts for 
over one-third of the total variation in net exports (the adjusted R-square is .371), and the 
overall relationship is significant at a probability of less than one-thousandth (significance of 
the F-statistic).  The explanatory variables conform to their predicted signs and are 
significant at less than five percent probability, except for the lagged trade balance, which is 
marginally non-significant using the ten percent or less rule.  The statistical results suggest 
that the agricultural trade balance is responsive to relative price changes.  A ten percent real 
devaluation (rert) prompts an increase (decrease) in the agricultural trade surplus (deficit) of 
2.7 percentage points.  This implies a relatively low elasticity for both exports and imports 
with respect to the real exchange rate.  By definition, the net trade balance elasticity is equal 
to the export elasticity minus the import elasticity.  Since the latter is negative, the coefficient 
implies that neither can be greater in absolute value than .27 (the maximum value for one if 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Salvador and Honduras to Nicaragua in the 1970s, and from Nicaragua to Costa Rica in later 
years.  See Bulmer-Thomas, et. al. (1992). 
17 That is, from greater than unity to less than unity in the fractional measure. 
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the other is zero).  Thus, devaluation improves net export performance, but the elasticities 
are low.   
A ten percent shift in relative prices in favour of agriculture relatively to 
manufacturing has a slightly greater effect, of 3.4 percentage points.  This can be interpreted 
as evidence of mobility of resources between sectors, with labour and capital shifting to 
agriculture when its price rises relatively to other tradables.   The ‘structural’ variable, the 
share of agriculture in national income, proves to be quite significant, with a high elasticity:  if 
the share of agriculture in GDP were to fall by one percent, the net agricultural export 
surplus decreases by almost two percentage points.  This is a long-term effect, which implies 
that over time, with constant relative prices, the Central American countries would decline as 
net agricultural exporters.  The marginally non-significant lagged net export share indicates 
that the adjustment to equilibrium is relatively rapid.18   
The ‘policy’ variable, the investigation of whose effect is the purpose of the exercise, 
shows a negative sign and is statistically significant at five percent probability.  The 
coefficient indicates that liberalised years were associated with a six percentage point 
negative shift in relative net exports, slightly less than half the negative shift associated with 
the conflict variable.  It should be stressed that this effect holds relative prices constant.  
Thus, while agricultural exports prove to be sensitive to relative prices, as theory would 
predict, the liberalised years were associated with lower net agricultural exports.  The 
constant term is significant, suggesting an omitted trend influence.  This is discussed below. 
 None of the country dummy variables is statistically significant.  This result is quite 
important and contrary to conventional wisdom.  The standard approach portrays Costa 
Rica as a particular success of trade liberalisation and domestic deregulation among the 
Central American countries, because it initiated its reforms prior to the other countries and 
with more vigour.  Whether or not it is the case that Costa Rica pursued reform with greater 
commitment, the statistical results reveal no significant difference in the behaviour of net 
agricultural exports when one accounts for the effects of relative prices and agriculture’s 
share in national income, in a context in which the policy dummy is negative and 
significant. 
                                                                 
18 From the model, one sees that the ‘reaction coefficient’ (the percentage of adjustment to 
equilibrium that occurs in one period) is .87 (one plus the coefficient on the lagged trade balance). 
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 World Price Effects 
 
 As interesting, and unexpected, as the results are, they raise the question, why did 
the policy shift toward trade liberalisation and domestic deregulation not have its predicted 
outcome on the agricultural sector in Central America?   The orthodox approach would turn 
to the movements in relative prices for the answer to this question.  In a competitive 
economy, comparative advantage is revealed through movements in relative prices.  The 
relative price argument develops through four parts:  first, with liberalisation of the external 
account, the exchange rate should find its equilibrium level;  second, the exchange rate 
adjustment should increase the prices of tradables relatively to non-tradables if domestic 
markets are deregulated.19  Third, if agriculture were labour intensive and the countries 
labour abundant, then within tradables agricultural prices should rise relatively to other 
tradables20 and relatively to the general price level.  And, fourth, relative exports of 
agricultural products should rise in response to the relative price changes.  Therefore, if 
relative exports did not rise, one would expect that relative prices did not move in favour of 
agriculture. 
 Table 6 provides the relative price data used in the regression, and these are shown 
graphically in Figures 1 and 2.  Part A of the table gives the purchasing power parity 
exchange rates for the 1980s and 1990s, calculated such that an increase indicates a real 
depreciation.  The numbers show that for Honduras and Nicaragua liberalisation of the 
current account had the predicted result:  the exchange rates depreciated during the period 
of liberalisation.  For Costa Rica and El Salvador the anticipated outcome was contradicted:  
after appreciations during the 1980s, the exchange rate showed a further appreciation during 
the 1990s.  In the case of Guatemala, the real exchange rate depreciated during the first five 
years of liberalisation, then appreciated slightly in the 1990s.  Overall, the hypothesis that 
exchange rate liberalisation results in real devaluation is not proved in Central America, for it 
is sustained in only two of five cases.  Further, Nicaragua must be considered a special case, 
                                                                 
19 Devaluation plays a central role in the liberalisation scenario (Krueger 1978). 
20 This relative price shift follows from the standard assumption that agriculture is labour 
intensive compared to other tradables, namely manufactures.  Were it the case that agriculture 
were less labour intensive, then the effect would be the reverse. 
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for the real depreciation of the exchange rate may have had more to do with the end of 
hyperinflation than with liberalisation as such.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain 
the appreciation of exchange rates, but one can hypothesise the following mechanisms:  short 
run financial inflows made possible by capital account liberalisation, inflow of worker 
remittances from the United States, and inflows of foreign direct investment.   
 In part B of the table is calculated the ratio of the agricultural value added deflator to 
the GDP price deflator.  First, it is interesting to note that during the import-substituting 
1970s, relative prices moved in favour of agriculture in four of the five countries (Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua). Relative prices moved against agriculture 
only in Honduras, which was the country that implemented import substitution least.  For the 
liberalised periods, the result was the reverse:  in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua relative prices moved against agriculture, and in favour only in Honduras.  Part of 
the explanation might be that the import-substituting policies of the Central American 
countries included emphasis upon processing of agricultural inputs, including ‘traditional 
exports’ such as coffee and cotton seed (Weeks 1985 and Bulmer-Thomas et. al. 1992). 21 
 
[Table 6 and Figures 1 and 2 go here] 
 
 In pursuit of an explanation of the decline in the revealed comparative advantage in 
agriculture, we disaggregate the output of the sector between products for domestic 
consumption and those for export.  Table 7 provides relevant price statistics.  The first five 
products listed in the table are the major exportables:  coffee, sugar, cotton, bananas, and 
livestock.  These together accounted for over eighty percent of agricultural exports during 
1980-1984, and about seventy-five percent during 1990-94.22  They are followed by four 
products of domestic consumption, maize, beans, rice, and wheat (‘importables’).   For 
each product, the trend in the absolute price level is calculated using simple regression 
analysis, for the years 1980-1994.23  For comparison, the US wholesale price index is given 
in the last row of the table.  The price trends suggest an explanation for the decline in the net 
                                                                 
21 This will be part of a larger study, in an extension of this paper. 
22 There was a dramatic change in composition, however.  In the former period, bananas 
accounted for less than twenty of agricultural exports and near forty percent in the latter period. 
23 For exportables the price is the average (trade-weighted) export price across the five countries.  
For the importables the average (trade-weighted) import (border) price across the five countries 
is used. 
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exports of the agricultural sector of the region.  For two of the exportables, coffee and 
sugar, the price trend is negative and statistically significant;  for two more, the trends are 
non-significant;  and for only one (bananas) is there a significant and positive tendency.  If 
the trend in the US wholesale price index is taken as a measure of the ‘world price level’, 
one can conclude that relative prices moved against all the region’s major exportables 
except bananas.  As one would expect, only bananas showed a consistent increase in share 
in total agricultural exports. 
 For the major importable agricultural products, three of the four show a significant 
and negative price trend over the period (with the trend for the fourth, beans, also negative, 
but non-significant).  Thus, on the import side, producers of basic food commodities in 
Central America faced declining international prices;  i.e., competition with cheapening 
imports.  Table 8 shows that falling border prices of importables was associated, as one 
would expect, with declining net exports of these products (increased net imports).   For the 
region as a whole, net exports of maize when from minus six percent of national production 
during 1970-79, to minus twenty-five percent during 1990-95 (with a lower proportional 
change if Costa Rica is excluded).  For rice, the deterioration was greater, from near self-
sufficiency during 1970-79, to net imports of almost forty percent of national production in 
the 1990s.  While the change for the region as a whole was massive for beans (minus three 
percent of national production to minus twenty-three, from the 1970s to the 1990s), almost 
all of this was in Costa Rica.24  When this country is excluded, the shift is a relatively small 
ten percentage points, plus six percent in the 1970s to minus 3.5 in the 1990s.  This 
relatively small shift is consistent with the non-significant trend in bean prices (see Table 7, 
‘importables’, number 2). 
 The information on price trends provides an explanation for the significant constant 
term in the regression results (Table 5): the trend term may result from the negative 
movement in the price terms of trade between Central America’s agricultural exportables 
and non-agricultural importables.  On the basis of the trend term, the price information in 
Table 7, and the net export statistics in Table 8, a ‘story’ can be constructed to account for 
the negative coefficient on the liberalisation variable in our model.  Declining world prices for 
                                                                 
24 The Costa Rican government ended subsidies to beans during the liberalisation process (Rueda-
Junquera 1996 and Weeks 1996). 
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the region’s major exportable and importable agricultural commodities tended, ceterius 
paribus, to undermine the return to most of the region’s major agricultural commodities.  On 
the export side this resulted in disincentives, such that in real terms agricultural exports grew 
slowly in every country but Costa Rica.  On the import side, declining international prices for 
the major importables also generated disincentives for producers in the region, with the 
result that agricultural imports grew rapidly.  Trade liberalisation exacerbated these effects, 
by bringing internal agricultural prices more closely in line with international prices.  
Exchange rate management (i.e., managed devaluations) might have offset the relative price 
shifts, but the liberalisation packages included exchange rate unification and non-intervention 
in foreign exchange markets.  Rather than depreciating to offset international price trends, 
exchange rates tended to appreciate in real terms under liberalisation.   
 
 [Tables 7 & 8 go here] 
 
 The statistics provide circumstantial evidence that trade liberalisation shifted 
incentives away from the major agricultural commodities in Central America.  An advocate 
of free market mechanisms might argue that this result is not a bad thing:  producers should 
shift from commodities with declining world prices to ones with rising or stable prices.  None 
would deny that the Central American countries needed export diversification.  Table 9 
shows that in the early 1980s five products accounted for toward ninety percent of 
agricultural exports in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and over seventy 
percent in Guatemala.  Inspection of the table suggests that liberalisation was coincident with 
some diversification, eleven percentage points for Costa Rica and nine for Guatemala, and 
over ten percent for both El Salvador and Nicaragua.25  For Honduras the change was small 
and merely a return to the degree of concentration of the early 1980s.  However, the 
diversification was not sufficient to prevent a deterioration of the agricultural trade balance in 
four of the five countries.   
 
 Policy Implications 
                                                                 
25 These percentage changes overstate the degree of diversification, since the share for bananas 
rose substantially.  Much of the decline was the result of the collapse of cotton production 
throughout the region. 
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 The statistical results suggest that the trade liberalisation and market deregulation 
policies were not associated with increases in net exports of agriculture in Central America.  
The main result would appear to have been import stimulation, with weak effects on exports.  
In part this could be explained by the failure of the exchange rate to depreciate in several of 
the countries.  However, when we account for this in our model, the liberalisation variable is 
still negative.  A purposeful trade policy, combining exchange rate management and 
subsidies to farm inputs, might have produced an outcome more favourable to the 
agricultural sector than deregulation and trade liberalisation.  If fostering agriculture was a 
policy goal, a judicious combination of export promotion and import substitution targeted to 
agriculture might have been more successful.  Whether or not this would have produced a 
better export performance for agriculture, the Central American evidence supports the 
conclusion that trade liberalisation is not sufficient to stimulate agricultural exports.  A 
country-by-country approach is required without prior theoretical bias as to outcome. 
 The elements of an alternative policy would be formulated in terms of an alternative 
agricultural policy, of which trade policy would be one part. The agricultural policy would 
be based on two principle goals, to diversify exports and to aid smallholders in the transition 
to a more deregulated and liberalised incentive environment.  The basic staples in Central 
America, especially maize, are the mainstays of smallholder incomes.26  Regional or country 
level tariffs would be used to protect smallholders, and combined with a programme to 
foster diversification into higher value added crops, such as vegetables for the North 
American market.  Rates of protection could be linked to fluctuations in border prices during 
a transitional period.  At the same time, directed credit and extension services would be 
used to encourage adoption of new crops.  These production-altering policies would be 
combined with exchange rate management to counter the disincentive effects of declining 
world prices.  Such a programme would be designed to facilitate, rather than prevent, trade-
induced changes in the structure of agricultural output. 
  
  
                                                                 
26 See Weeks 1995b, annex, where the production of different products by size of farm is 
analysed for Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras. 
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Annex 1:  Policy Changes in Central America 
 
 This annex gives the chronology of policy changes in the Central American 
countries.  Table A1.1 provides a chronology by country of the major policy reforms.  To 
put these in context, Table A1.2 provides a ‘before’ and ‘after’ summary of these changes.  
The sources for the tables (in order of detail provided) are :  Buttari (1990), Paz Calferata 
(1993), Weeks (1995a and 1995b), Rueda-Junquera (1996), and CEPAL (1995). 
 
Table A1.1  Chronology of Major Policy Changes in Central America 
Country Year and policy change 
Costa Rica 1984  start of privatisation 
1985  crawling peg exchange rate, export incentives, export free zone 
1986  tariff liberalisation, interest rate liberalisation, reforms of  basic grains pricing 
and subsidies  
1987  tax reform, cut in support prices for basic grains, trade liberalisation, 
application to GATT 
1988  financial sector reform, trade liberalisation 
1989  revised export incentives, trade liberalisation 
1994  wheat & rice imports completely privatised 
El Salvador 1989  liberalisation of exchange rate, liberalisation of interest rates, trade reform, 
price deregulation, bank privatisation, petroleum sector reforms, agricultural 
sector reforms and liberalisation (including elimination of state purchasing of 
grains), clearinghouse for exports, elimination of export taxes except coffee 
1990  unification of free market exchange rate, more privatisation of banking, 
reduction of tariffs, implication and reduction of tax rates, more liberalisation of 
petroleum sector, increase and unification of interest rates, coffee exports 
privatised, sugar refineries privatised 
Guatemala  1986  liberalisation of price controls, simplification of exchange rate, increases in 
interest rates, reduction of exchange rate subsidies, increases in selected prices 
(including petroleum), restructuring of customs administration, tariff reductions 
on textiles 
1987 tax reform, simplification of export administration, unification of commodity 
trade into regulated exchange market 
1988  unification of exchange rate, reduction in price controls  
1989  freely floating exchange rate, elimination of exchange rate guarantees, tariff 
reform, export incentives, liberalisation of interest rates, export free zones 
1990  elimination of temporary export tax, auction system for exchange rate, tariff 
liberalisation, taxes on exports eliminated, elimination of import quotas on 
agricultural products, elimination of export ban on basic grains 
Honduras 1990  market-based crawling peg for exchange rate, raised interest rate ceilings, 
tariff reform, partial price liberalisation, temporary export tax on non-traditional 
exports rescinded 
Nicaragua 1990  reform of the exchange rate regime (through introduction of new currency 
pegged one-to-one with the US dollar), deregulation of interest rates 
1991  eliminated state monopoly on trade, privatisation, tariff reform, export incentives 
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Table A1.2 
Summary of Policy Regimes in Central America, circa 1994 
Policy Area Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala  Honduras Nicaragua 
Exchange  
Rate 
Pre-liberali-
sation   
Fixed to US 
dollar 
Fixed to US 
dollar, market 
segmented by 
type of 
transaction 
Fixed to US 
dollar 
Multiple 
exchange rates 
Fixed to US 
dollar, (multiple 
rates), large 
‘black market’ 
premium 
Post-liberali- 
sation 
Free, with some 
CB 
intervention 
Free, with some 
CB 
intervention 
Flexible, 
administered 
Free, with some 
CB 
intervention 
Flexible, 
administered 
(crawling peg) 
Tariffs 
Pre-liberali-
sation   
Rates to 100%, 
import 
surcharges, 
tariff 
exemptions 
Tariff range 5-
35%, with 50% 
for certain 
products  
Tariff range  
0–40%, 
surcharge on 
imports 
Tariff range 0-
120%, 
surcharge on 
imports 
Tariff range 4-
253% 
Post-liberali- 
sation 
Large tariff 
reductions, 
harmonisation 
to CA Tariff 
System (0-
20%); 
special tariff on 
rice 
Large tariff 
reductions, 
harmonisation 
to CA Tariff 
System (0-
20%); 
 
Harmonisation 
to CA Tariff 
System (0-
20%); 
 
Tariff range 0-
40%, 
harmonisation 
to CA Tariff 
System (0-
20%); 
 
harmonisation 
to CA Tariff 
System (0-
20%); 
 
Import 
Restrictions 
Pre-liberali-
sation   
Deposits for 
imports, 
licenses for 
basic grains 
Permits for 
basic grains 
Licenses for 
basic grains, 
wheat, sugar, 
seeds, milk, 
fruits, 
agricultural 
inputs 
Licenses from 
central bank for 
all imports 
Licenses for all 
imports 
Post-liberali- 
sation 
Licenses 
required for 
poultry & diary 
products  
Licenses for 
sugar & 
molasses 
Restrictions for 
cattle and 
processed meat 
Licenses for 
sugar & 
poultry 
Restrictions on 
sugar imports 
Export 
Restrictions/ 
Incentives 
Pre-liberali-
sation   
Permits to 
export grains, 
seeds, 
sorghum; 
export taxes 
Permits to 
export grains, 
export taxes 
Permits for 
most 
agricultural 
exports (not 
coffee) 
Permits for all 
exports, export 
taxes, 
‘temporary’ ex-
port surcharge 
Restrictions on 
foreign 
exchange 
retention by 
exporters, 
permits for 
most exports 
Post-liberali- 
sation 
Restriction on 
wood exports;  
export taxes on 
coffee based 
on world price 
(not charged in 
1993-94) 
Restrictions on 
exports to CA 
of cotton, 
sugar, coffee & 
wheat flour;  
export taxes 
eliminated 
Elimination of 
export licenses;  
Export taxes on 
coffee & 
bananas (one 
& 1.5% of 
value) 
Licenses 
required for 
sugar, edible 
oils & poultry;  
export taxes on 
coffee (non-
processed, if 
world price 
above US$70), 
bananas (US$ 
.50 per box), 
sugar (if world 
price above 
US$ 15) 
No licenses, no 
export taxes 
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Table A1.2 Continued 
Policy Area Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala  Honduras Nicaragua 
Price 
Controls  
Pre-liberali-
sation   
Prices of 
products in 
‘basic 
consumption 
basket’, 
guaranteed 
producer prices 
for grains 
(except rice, 
whose price set 
for mills) 
240 products 
price 
controlled, 
guaranteed 
prices for 
grains 
Price control 
on white maize, 
beans, milk, 
some meat 
products  
Price controls 
on sugar, oils, 
coffee, poultry, 
wheat, milk, & 
several other 
products; 
Guaranteed 
prices for basic 
grains 
Price controls 
on ‘basic’ 
consumer 
goods, state 
trading in most 
consumer 
goods 
Post-liberali- 
sation 
Regulation of 
profit margin 
for:  rice, 
beans, white 
maize, 
molasses;  
price setting 
for sugar, 
coffee, bread 
flour, poultry 
No price 
controls or 
guaranteed 
prices; 
No price 
controls or 
guaranteed 
prices; 
No price 
controls or 
guaranteed 
prices, except 
for sugar & 
coffee (low 
quality); 
No price 
controls or 
guaranteed 
prices; 
State 
Marketing 
Pre-liberali-
sation   
National 
Production 
Council (CNP) 
intervened in 
grains market 
(except rice) 
through 
domestic & 
external sales 
and purchases  
Food Regulator 
Institute  (IRA) 
intervened in 
grains market 
through 
domestic & 
external sales 
and purchases  
Agricultural 
Marketing 
Institute 
(INDECA) 
intervened in 
grains market 
through 
domestic & 
external sales 
and purchases  
Agricultural 
Marketing 
Institute 
(IHMA) 
intervened in 
grains market 
through 
domestic & 
external sales 
and purchases; 
State 
monopoly on 
grain imports 
National Basic 
Food 
enterprise 
(ENABUS) 
intervened in 
grains market 
through 
domestic & 
external sales 
and purchases, 
owned 80% of 
storage 
facilities; state 
controlled 55% 
of all imports & 
98% of all 
exports  
Post-liberali- 
sation 
In beans & 
white corn 
(minor) 
Marketing 
agency closed, 
state monopoly 
on trade in 
coffee & sugar 
eliminated, 
price band for 
yellow maize, 
rice & sorghum 
No state 
participation in 
basic products 
trade, notional 
price band for 
yellow maize, 
rice & Sorghum 
State supplier 
of basic 
products 
imports small 
amounts of 
rice, sugar, 
chicken, maize, 
price band for 
yellow maize, 
rice & Sorghum 
State role 
reduced to a 
minimum, Price 
band for yellow 
maize, rice & 
Sorghum 
Note:  ‘Pre-liberalisation’ refers to the situation just prior to the following dates:  Costa Rica 1985, El 
Salvador 1990, Guatemala 1985, Honduras 1990, and Nicaragua 1990. 
Source: Paz Calferata 1993, annex tables. 
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Annex 2:  Data Sources and Variables 
Date Sources: 
 The major sources are FAOSTAT, a database on ‘floppy’ disk from the FAO, and 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank, on CD-ROM.  The latter has been 
replaced by a new CD-ROM, more technically advanced, but with a shorter time series.  
There are no relative price data for 1965-1969 in the case of Guatemala.  Thus, the 
regression is over the years 1970-1994. 
 1.  Agricultural exports and imports:  FAOSTAT (1996), in current US dollars. 
 2.  Agricultural value added (GDP): in current US dollars, World Development 
Indicators, World Bank.  Slightly different time series are found in SIECA (1981, 1988, & 
1990) and CEPAL (1996b). 
 3.  Constant price agricultural GDP:  in 1978 prices, World Development 
Indicators, World Bank (‘Stars’ on CD ROM). 
 4.  Relative prices:  nominal exchange rate, GDP deflator, agricultural sector 
deflator, manufacturing sector deflator, World Development Indicators, World Bank 
(‘Stars’ on CD ROM). 
 
Regression variables: 
 1.  Change in net agricultural exports, as proportion of sectoral value added, 
measured as the absolute change, 
 xnt = (Xnt) - (Xnt-1) 
 2.  Change in the real effective exchange rate (RER) 
 Since for all the countries the US wholesale price index would serve as the measure 
of international prices, it is not included in the calculation.  The variable is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of the exchange rate deflated by the GDP price index) in years t 
and t-1: 
 rert = ln[RERt]/[ RERt-1] 
 3.  Change in the relative prices of agricultural and manufacturing prices (RPAM).  
This variable is a proxy for relative price changes within tradable goods. 
 rpamt = ln[RPAMt]/[ RPAMt-1] 
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 For Guatemala, sector price deflators begin in 1987.  For 1970-1986, the external 
net barter terms of trade were used (FAOSTAT). 
 4.  Change in the share of agricultural value added in total GDP (shgdpt): 
 shgdpt = ln[SHGDPt/SHGDPt-1] 
 5.  Conflict:  This variable assumes a value of unity for El Salvador and Nicaragua 
in the following years: 
 El Salvador:  1981-1989 
 Nicaragua:  1977-1979, 1983-1989. 
 6.  Policy:  This variable assumes the value of unity for the following years:  
 Costa Rica 1982-1994 
 El Salvador 1989-1994 
 Guatemala 1985-1994 
 Honduras 1990-1994 
 Nicaragua 1989-1994 
 For an explanation of the choice of these time periods, see Weeks (1995a, pp. 70-
73). 
 7.  For the country dummies, Costa Rica is the omitted variable. 
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Table  1:  Characterisation of Policy Regimes by Period, 1960-1995 
Country 
Period 
1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995 
Costa Rica Shift towards 
import 
substitution 
Import  
Substitution  
interventions 
Moderate  
Liberalisation 
& deregulation 
Liberalised 
(from 1983) 
 
 
Liberalised 
 
El Salvador Shift towards 
import 
substitution 
Import  
Substitution  
interventions 
Strong  
intervention 
Moderate  
Liberalisation 
& deregulation 
 
Liberalised 
 
Guatemala Shift towards 
import 
substitution 
Import  
Substitution  
interventions 
Moderate  
Liberalisation 
& deregulation 
Continued  
Liberalisation 
& deregulation 
 
Liberalised 
 
Honduras Minor import 
substitution 
policies 
Mild Interven-
tions (not part 
of regional 
import 
substitution) 
No change Little change Major  
Liberalisation 
& deregulation 
Nicaragua Shift towards 
import 
substitution 
Import  
Substitution  
interventions 
Strong  
intervention 
Moderate  
Liberalisation 
& deregulation 
Major  
Liberalisation 
& deregulation 
Comments CACM 
officially 
begun in 1963 
CACM at its 
peak in first 
half of decade 
(without 
Honduras);  
insurrection in 
Nicaragua 
1977-79 
Collapse of the 
CACM;  war in 
El Salvador & 
Nicaragua 
War continues 
in El Salvador 
& Nicaragua, 
ceases in both 
countries by 
end of decade 
Government 
changes in 
Nicaragua 
(1990) 
Source:  See Annex 1. 
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Table 2:  Growth Rates of Constant Price Agricultural Value Added, 
Central America, 1960-1994 
 Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
 
1960-64 
 
3.5 
 
6.4 
 
5.0 
 
5.3 
 
12.5 
1965-69 7.7 1.8 3.8 6.2 6.1 
1970-74 3.6 4.8 6.8 .7 6.6 
1975-79 2.6 3.9 3.4 3.9 0.1 
1980-84 2.8 -3.2 -.1 1.9 -1.3 
1985-89 3.1 -.5 2.2 3.9 -3.6 
1990-94 3.6 4.0 3.1 3.9 0.0 
Source:  World Bank 1995, except for Guatemala (CEPAL 1996b, for 1960-1986). 
 
Table 3:  Trend Rate of Growth of Constant Price Exports  
& ‘Liberalisation Shift’, Central America, 1980-1995 
 Trend Shift Dummy R2 & F-stat 
Costa Rica 6.6 neg 0.739 
 @ .01 non sig 17.0 
El Salvador neg pos 0.035 
 non sig non sig 0.2 
Guatemala 3.5 neg 0.267 
 @ .10 @ .05 2.19 
Honduras 1.9 neg 0.196 
 @ .10 non sig 1.4 
Nicaragua -7.1 pos 0.681 
 @ .01 non sig 12.8 
Note: The trend coefficient is multiplied by 100 to yield a percent rate of growth. 
Source:  World Bank 1995. 
 
Table 4:  Net Agricultural Exports by Period, 1965-1995 
A.  Millions of current US dollars (annual averages) 
Countries: 
Periods: 
 
Costa Rica 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
Nicaragua 
Central 
America 
Excluding 
Costa Rica 
1965-69 98 103 143 101 103 548 450 
1970-74 179 172 232 117 158 858 679 
1975-79 464 493 658 285 401 2300 1837 
1980-84 519 401 708 441 225 2293 1774 
1985-89 641 288 648 535 108 2220 1580 
1990-95 853 67 563 408 45 1936 1083 
 
B.  As Percentage of Sectoral Value Added (annual averages) 
Countries: 
Periods: 
 
Costa Rica 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
Nicaragua 
Central 
America 
Excluding 
Costa Rica 
Annual 
Averages: 
1965-69 
 
 
59.0 
 
 
43.5 
 
 
na 
 
 
48.4 
 
 
65.4 
 
 
na 
 
 
na 
1970-74 68.6 51.9 34.7 50.3 62.2 49.4 45.9 
1975-79 75.9 64.8 46.2 66.7 88.4 63.2 60.5 
1980-84 73.9 47.1 32.2 76.8 39.3 46.5 42.0 
1985-89 76.2 40.8 32.3 75.0 18.1 46.2 39.9 
1990-95 77.5 10.8 22.1 70.0 9.1 39.7 28.6 
Notes and Sources:  Maximum values in bold. FAO 1996 (exports and imports) and World Bank 1995 
(GDP).  See Annex 2. 
 30
Table 5: 
OLS Results of Annual Percentage Point Change in Net Agricultural Exports,  
As Proportion of Agricultural Value Added, 1970-1994 
[Dependent variable measured in percentage point changes] 
 Coefficient Std Error T-stat Significance 
 
Constant 
 
 
.0616 
 
.0319 
 
1.933 
 
.0559 
Explanatory variables 
1. Change in Relative  
     prices 
    agric/manuf   (rpamt ): 
 
 
 
.3425 
 
 
 
.0962 
 
 
 
3.561 
 
 
 
.0006 
2. Change in Real  
     exchange rate  (rert ) 
 
.2710 
 
.1188 
 
2.281 
 
.0245 
3. Change in Share of      
    agriculture in GDP 
    (shgdpt ) 
 
1.7867 
 
.3206 
 
5.572 
 
.0000 
4. Net agric exports 
     (xnt-2) 
 
-.1259 
 
.03190 
 
-1.644 
 
.1032 
Dummy Variables 
5. Policy 
 
 
-.0592 
 
.0304 
 
-1.943 
 
.0546 
6. Conflict 
 
-.1315 .0451 -2.917 .0043 
7. El Salvador .0302 .0443 .684 .4954 
(nsgn) 
8. Guatemala -.0072 .0412 -.174 .8622 
(nsgn) 
9. Honduras -.0320 .0411 -.778 .4384 
(nsgn) 
10. Nicaragua -.0405 .0454 -.890 .3752 
(nsgn) 
Adjusted R-squared  
& F-stat 
.3707 
7.9501 
df=108 
sgn of  F: 
.000 
 
Note:  For sources and explanation of variables, see Annex 2. 
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Table 6:  Changes in Relative Prices, Central America, 1960-1994 
A.  Real Exchange Rate (average for 1970-1994 = 100) 
Country 
Years 
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala  Honduras Nicaragua 
1970-74 165 196 177 161 174 
1975-79 97 118 105 111 110 
1980-84 94 75 69 73 66 
1985-89 78 63 77 64 70 
1990-94 66 48 73 91 81 
 
B. Ratio of Agricultural to Manufacturing Price Deflator   
(average for 1970-1994 = 100) 
Country 
Years 
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala  Honduras Nicaragua 
1970-74 85 111 106 100 85 
1975-79 111 148 120 89 111 
1980-84 113 107 94 71 113 
1985-89 99 77 96 110 99 
1990-94 88 46 81 136 88 
 
Note:  In Part B, for El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, the last year is 1993.  For Guatemala, 1970-
1986 is the external terms of trade.  See Annex 2. 
Source:  World Bank 1995. 
 
Table 7:  Regression-calculated International Price Trends  
for the Major Central American Commodities, 1980-1995 
Crop Trend Statistic 
(percent p. a.) 
R-square &  
F-statistic 
Exportables 
1. Coffee 
 
- 3.8 
(.02) 
 
.327 
6.8 
2. Sugar - 2.1 
(.10) 
.183 
3.3 
3. Cotton 0.8 
(ns) 
.032 
0.5 
4. Bananas 2.2 
(.01) 
.818 
62.8 
5. Livestock .000 
(ns) 
.001 
0.1 
Importables 
1. Maize 
 
- 2.1 
(.01) 
 
.420 
8.7 
2. Beans - 1.1 
(ns) 
.033 
0.4 
3. Rice - 2.9 
(.01) 
.568 
15.8 
4. Wheat - 1.4 
(.10) 
.246 
3.9 
USA WPI 1.8 
(.01) 
.909 
130.3 
Note:  Prices are the average paid for Central America as a whole. 
Source:  CEPAL 1996a.
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Table 8:  Net Exports of Staples, 1970-1994 
( as percentage of national production) 
A.  Maize 
Countries: 
Periods: 
 
Costa Rica 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
Nicaragua 
Central 
America 
Excluding 
Costa Rica 
1970-79 -18.8 -2.0 -4.4 -1.3 -4.5 -5.7 -3.6 
1980-84 -70.5 -10.8 -2.9 -5.2 -36.4 -10.5 -8.0 
1985-89 -88.9 -8.9 -2.4 -4.3 -14.2 -8.9 -5.3 
1990-95 -568.9 -20.5 -12.4 -13.4 -8.9 -24.6 -14.1 
 
B.  Rice 
Countries: 
Periods: 
 
Costa Rica 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
Nicaragua 
Central 
America 
Excluding 
Costa Rica 
1970-79 7.1 1.5 -12.2 -15.3 6.9 -2.3 -4.8 
1980-84 15.9 -13.9 -7.4 -3.8 -21.8 -1.0 -13.5 
1985-89 -9.1 -20.3 -14.1 -4.4 -53.1 -20.4 -27.6 
1990-95 -27.5 -43.7 -84.0 -35.4 -40.5 -37.8 -44.6 
 
C.  Beans 
Countries: 
Periods: 
 
Costa Rica 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
Nicaragua 
Central 
America 
Excluding 
Costa Rica 
1970-79 -37.4 -7.3 -3.1 10.9 8.0 -3.2 6.1 
1980-84 -97.3 -0.1 -0.9 3.4 -22.2 -9.4 -4.4 
1985-89 7.6 -5.3 -1.9 -3.4 -25.4 -6.6 -8.0 
1990-95 -38.3 -17.1 -3.3 -5.4 3.6 -23.2 -3.5 
Sources:  Weeks 1990, 1996 & CEPAL 1996a. 
  
 
Table 9: 
Proportion of Agricultural Export Earnings Contributed 
by Coffee, Cotton, Sugar, Bananas & Meat, 1980s & 1990s 
Countries: 
Periods: 
 
Costa Rica 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
Nicaragua 
1980-84 89 92 75 85 88 
1985-89 84 95 75 89 92 
1990-94 78 81 68 85 80 
percentage 
pt change 
(lib - prelib) 
 
 
-11 
 
 
-14 
 
 
-9 
 
 
-4 
 
 
-12 
Source:  CEPAL 1996b. 
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Figure 1:  Real Exchange Rates in Central America, 1970-1994 
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Figure 2:  Ratio of Agricultural to Manufacturing Deflator, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras & Nicaragua, 1970-1994 
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